Conclusion
Exceptions for Bishul Akum
Nahmanides, quoted by R. Yosef Karo in Beth Yosef[1], writes that Bishul Akum does not apply to one’s servants. He refers to servants owned by a master, a phenomenon still common in medieval times, and explains that they are, in a sense, an extension of the Jewish master and therefore do not fall under the rubric of non-Jews. Nahmanides also adds that this is not a theoretical statement but the widespread practice. The exception given to servants working in a Jewish household is significant, because it is only given for food cooked by non-Jews, and not to wine touched by them. This shows that people intuitively understood that the original decree against Bishul Akum does not apply to someone who works for you, and that the rabbis respected people’s opinion.
Nahmanides’ disciple, the Rashba, further explains that the reason the servants are excluded from the decree is that[2]:
The prohibition was meant to prevent intermarriage, which is the result of extreme closeness. This decree only applies to one who prepares and serves food of his own accord because of his love to his Jewish friends. The servants must cook, whether or not they want to…
R. Mordechai Yafeh (Poland, 1530-1612) extends the exclusion from servants owned by a Jew to regular employees[3]:
We are not concerned about intermarriage, because they are of a lower status which naturally separates them… they will also not risk their livelihood by feeding us non-Kosher food… the practice is to be lenient even with employees [who are only hired and not owned by the Jew] because one of the Jewish members of the household is bound to stir the coals.
The argument of R. Yafeh in favor of the practice is very weak. He does not require someone to stoke the fire, but rather says that it will certainly happen. It is farfetched to assume that in every Jewish household, every time something is cooked, a Jew will decide to help with stoking the fire. Indeed, in later generations, this was replaced with a requirement that a Jew will turn on the fire. It is obvious, though, that R. Yafeh’s argument is an attempt to defend a practice which took root and which was very reasonable.
Finally, let us go back in time to R. Aharon HaLevi (Spain, 14th century), aka the Raah, who makes a very logical distinction[4]:
A baker bakes in a designated place and is not cooking for himself or for any specific person. He rather does his work as a hired employee, which is to bake and cook for all who come [to purchase food], in a designated place, where people do not eat and drink [as they do at home] and it is open to everyone. Here we can say that it is not considered Bishul Akum because there is no friendship and closeness [among the clients].
The Raah, who speaks of baking and cooking interchangeably, argues that the original prohibition of Bishul Akum only applied to food prepared by a non-Jewish friend or acquaintance, and served in circumstances which foster friendship and could lead to intermarriage.
It therefore follows that commercially prepared food, while requiring supervision for kosher ingredients, does not fall under the rubric of Bishul akum. Similarly, in the case of eating at the house of a non-Kosher friend, there should be no concern about this prohibition.
Conclusion:
When invited to a non-Kosher household with the promise of preparing kosher food for you, and assuming that you trust the host and that he will purchase kosher meat, your decision largely depends on your feelings after the visit. If you know that despite all the explanations presented here you will be haunted forever by the fear that you have consumed non-kosher food, thus contaminating body and soul, you should find a polite way to refrain from accepting the invitation. If, however, you will toss and turn at night thinking of the divine wrath which might be unleashed against you for eating non-Kosher food, you may rest assured that by accepting the invitation you will not transgress any prohibition. As a matter of fact, the greater offense, which might raise God’s wrath, is rejecting the invitation, insulting the host, and deepening the chasm between factions of the Jewish people.
As I said at the introduction to this series, it is your choice.
[1] בית יוסף, יורה דעה, סימן קיג: כתוב בארחות חיים (הל’ איסורי מאכלות סי’ סז) כתב הרמב”ן בתשובה דעתי שאין איסור בשפחות הללו הקנויות לנו דמלאכה דעבד ערל דישראל היא דקנוי לו למעשה ידיו ומוזהר עליו בשבת מן התורה וליתיה בכלל גוים והילכך ליתיה בכלל גזרות דידהו וכן נהגו עכ”ל
[2] שו”ת הרשב”א, חלק א, סימן סח: שיש מרבותינו ז”ל שעמעמו על בשולי העבדים והשפחות שלנו להתיר. ונותנין טעם לדבריהם שאין איסור הבשול אלא מגזרת חתנות. ואין גזרת חתנות וקרוב הדעת אלא במי שעושה מרצונו לאהבת הישראל. ואלו עושין בין ירצו בין לא ירצו ואין קרוב הדעת בכיוצא בזה ולא גזרת חתנות
[3] לבוש, יורה דעה, סימן קיג סעיף א: אלו השפחות הקנויות לנו למלאכתן לא גזרו בהן, שכיון שמוזהר עליה בשבת מן התורה כמו שנתבאר בלבוש החור סימן ד”ש [סעיף א] הרי מלאכתה קנוי לו למעשה ידיה וליתא בכלל גוים שגזרו עליהם, דלא חיישינן באלו משום חתנות, דמשום שפלותן בלאו הכי לא יתחתן עמהם, ולא משום שמא יאכילנו דבר טמא, שאימת רבם עליהם, ויש אוסרין, ונוהגין להקל באלו השפחות שבבית אפילו אינם קנויות לנו אלא משרתות אותנו, מפני שאי אפשר שלא יחתה מעט אחד מבני הבית באש
[4] בדק הבית על תורת הבית, בית ג שער ז: ועוד שהאופה אופה בבית מיוחד לכך ואינו מתכוין לבשל לעצמו ולא לשום אדם מיוחד אלא למלאכתו לפי שהוא שכיר לאפות ולבשל לכל הבא בבית מיוחד שאין בני אדם אוכלין בו ולא שותין בו והוא רשות הרבים לכל העולם בזה אפשר לדון לזכות דכי הא לא חשיב בשולי נכרים דלא שייך בהא איקרובי דעתא
